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FACING THE CHALLENGE: CORRUPTION,
STATE CAPTURE AND THE ROLE OF
MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS
NIKOLAY A. OuzouNoV*

you yourself are much condemn'd to
"Let me tell you, Cassius,
1
have an itching palm."
I.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption awareness has exploded in recent years.2
Corruption as a phenomenon has emerged from the backstage of
local socio-political concerns to the forefront of global economic,
legal, and development debate.3 One of the main reasons for the
prevailing perception that corruption is on the rise4 is the end of
the Cold War and the following exponential integration of the
world's economy and open markets.5 Local problems have become
* J.D. The John Marshall Law School, 2004.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 4, sc. 2.
2. See Demetri Sevastopulo, US Delays Mobile Phone Contracts to
Investigate Claims of Iraqi Cronyism, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at Al (noting
that the U.S. "authorities had been struck by the resilience of corrupt business
practices in Baghdad").
In a prolonged corruption trial, a French court
sentenced to prison twenty-nine top Elf executives and officials of the former
state-owned oil company and issued fines totaling $23 million. See Elfs and
Dwarfs, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2003, at 49.
3. See Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 7-12 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed.,
1997) (noting that there have been "real and perceived increases in corrupt
activity" in what the authors call a "revolution" in worldwide attitude towards
corruption). Despite often culturally different perspectives on corruption, the
authors find a uniform decrease in the desire to tolerate corrupt practices. Id.
at 8. See also Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance:
Corruption,CorporateResponsibility and Ethical Standardsin the New Global
Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 389, 391 (1997) (noting that
"businessmen around the world are paying closer attention to the risks, costs,
and consequences of bribery, graft, and other forms of corruption in
international business").
4. Whether actual increase in corruption takes place is inherently difficult
to determine, however, perceptions that corruption is increasing may be
explained to a certain extent by recent political and economic liberalization.
Glynn et al., supra note 3, at 8.
5. Id. at 9-10. As the authors point out, the notion of national and personal
security has been redefined after the end of the Cold War. Id. at 10. In the
absence of two opposing military and ideological camps, the importance of
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global, and it is no longer disputed that corruption in business
transactions is a serious global problem.6
Recent years have witnessed international scandals that
"have reduced tolerance for corruption and increased receptiveness
to legal solutions that, until recently, commentators viewed
suspiciously."7 Allegations of corruption seem to be present far too
often, both in developing and transition economies, 8 as well as in
Western Europe and the United States.9 Commentators have
almost universally acknowledged that high levels of corruption
retard economic development"° and undermine public trust in
In developing
businesses, institutions, and governments."
interacting economic and political conditions has increased to the extent that
"[tihe security of one nation can be radically affected by purely domestic
developments in a seemingly distant state." Id.
6. See Phillip M. Nichols, Regulating TransnationalBribery in Times of
Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 272-74 (1999)
[hereinafter Globalization and Fragmentation] (arguing that transnational
bribery of public officials has increased significantly in the last decade).
According to Nichols, "there has been a tremendous deterioration in the last
ten years, with grand corruption becoming the general rule, rather than the
exception, in major government-influenced contracts in the South." Id. at 273.
7. Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change,
and Transnational Bribery, 33

CORNELL

INT'L

L.J.

657,

658

(2000)

[hereinafter A Delicate Balance].
8. See JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HuSISIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 9-12

(1997) (noting that although corruption is particularly severe in transition
economies, corruption investigations make headlines in countries ranging
from Germany and England to South Africa and Singapore).
9. Steve LeVine, U.S. Bribery Probe Looks at Mobil, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23,
2003, at A2. In a recent, and what many experts believe to be one of the
largest, bribery allegation "the U.S. is investigating whether Exxon Mobil
Corp. participated in a scheme to route $78 million from U.S. and European
oil" firms to the president of Kazakhstan and his circle. Id. See also
Norwegian Oil Chief Resigns in Fallout Over Iranian Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2003, at C19 (noting that the chief executive of Norway's largest oil
company, Statoil ASA, resigned after a bribery scandal concerning the
company's expansion interest in Iran).
10. Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 45 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed.,

1997) [hereinafter PoliticalEconomy of Corruption]. The author comments
that "cross-country research suggests a negative association between growth
and high levels of corruption." Id. at 45-46. See generally JOEL S. HELLMAN
ET AL., FAR FROM HOME: Do FOREIGN INVESTORS IMPORT HIGHER STANDARDS
OF GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES? 3 (The World Bank, Policy

Research Working Paper, 2002) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE IN
http://www.worldbank.orgwbi/governancepdf/
TRANSITION
ECONOMIES],
farfromhome.pdf.
11. See IVAN KRASTEV, THE INFLEXIBILITY TRAP: FRUSTRATED SOCIETIES,

WEAK STATES AND DEMOCRACY 17-18 (United Nations Dev. Programme,
Issues Paper, 2002), http://www.ceu.hu/cps/bluebird/pap/krastevl.pdf (noting
an increased public sensitivity to corruption and its negative effect on the
democratic process in South-East Europe). See also Steven R. Salbu,
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countries and transition economies, corruption has been rightly
blamed for lack of foreign investments, 2 slow economic growth, 3
governmental inefficiency and shaky institutions. 4
Earlier
arguments that bribes may grease the wheels of state
bureaucracies, and therefore are beneficial, have been largely
refuted."
Regardless of its various definitions, corruption has been
mostly studied from the perspective of state control and
intervention in the economy, as well as according to the degree of
bureaucrats' discretionary power.16 Restraining the "grabbing
hand" 7 of the government has been the major thrust of recent
Information Technology in the War Against International Bribery and
Corruption: The Next Frontierof InstitutionalReform, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
67, 70-71 (2001) [hereinafter The Next Frontierof InstitutionalReform].
12. Corruption reduces incentives to invest because of the uncertainty that
prevails in a corrupt regime. Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on
Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis,
in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 83, 86-87 (Kimberly Ann Elliott

ed., 1997). Foreign investors may see payment of bribes as a form of taxation
(i.e., when the issuance of a license requires the payment of a bribe) that
discourages them from doing business in the country. Id. See Joel S. Hellman
et al., Are Foreign Investors and MultinationalsEngaging in Corrupt Practices
in Transition Economies?, TRANSITION: THE NEWSL. ABOUT REFORMING

ECONOMIES (World Bank/William Davidson InstJStockholm Inst. for
Transition Economies/Bank of Finland Inst. for Economies in Transition,
Washington, D.C.), May-June-July 2000, at 4 [hereinafter Foreign Investors
and Corrupt Practices], http://www.worldbank.orghtml/prddr/trans/pdf/
MayJunJuly20.pdf (noting "significant negative association between per capita
[foreign direct investment] and the extent of administrative and 'grand'
corruption").
13. The Next Frontierof InstitutionalReform, supra note 11, at 70-71.
14. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption-A General Review with Emphasis
on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 454-55 (1997) (noting
an emerging consensus" among economists that corruption has disruptive
effects on "political and bureaucratic stability and efficiency").
15. See Kimberly Ann Elliot, Corruption as an International Policy
Problem: Overview and Recommendations, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 175, 186 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (noting that "[wihile
positive effects in certain situations have been claimed for corruption, most
scholars agree ... that widespread corruption is detrimental to economic and
political development"). Even in the rare occasions when corruption may
increase efficiency, because corrupt transactions are secret and nontransparent, it is impossible to ensure that the public interest is preserved.
Id. at 187.
16. JOEL S. HELLMAN ET AL., MEASURING GOVERNANCE AND STATE
CAPTURE: THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRATS AND FIRMS IN SHAPING THE BUSINESS

ENVIRONMENT 4 (European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Working Paper
No. 51, 2000) [hereinafter BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT], http://www.ebrd.com/
pubs/econ/workingp/51.pdf.
17. See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING
HAND: GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES (1998). I will explore

the notion of the government's "grabbing hand" in more detail in Part III of
this Article.
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anti-corruption debate.18 The purpose of this Article, however, is
to shed some light at the reverse relationship, where powerful,
multinational businesses attempt to shape the business climate in
a dominated state, a situation particularly prevalent in some
developing and transition economies.
Part II of this Article gives a general overview of corruption
as an economic and legal phenomenon. This section draws an
important distinction between grand and petty corruption. Part
III introduces the concept of state capture and distinguishes state
capture from other forms of corruption, such as procurement
kickbacks and facilitation payments. This Part also analyzes the
negative effects of corruption and state capture on development,
economic growth, and political stability. Part IV proposes a
modified approach for battling corruption that necessitates not
only the involvement of governments through legislation and
enforcement, but also requires active assistance from business
enterprises, non-governmental organizations CNGOs"), and the
general public. Part V concludes.
The purpose of this Article is not to propose a "miracle cure"
in the efforts against corruption and state capture in particular.
Rather, drawing on research and analysis from various experts in
the field, I intend to link corruption and state capture with a
comprehensive, "portfolio" anti-corruption approach, emphasizing
the important role of multinational business enterprises in
reducing corruption. Such an approach presents a middle ground
between the rigidity of extraterritorial legislation on one hand,
and the need for decisive, yet culturally-conscious, anti-bribery
measures on the other.
This Article primarily will discuss the transition economies of
the former communist bloc and South-East Asia, as examples of
two areas that have recently yielded abundant data. Because the
goal of this article is to address state capture and grand corruption
in general, I will use the terms corruption and bribery
interchangeably, although as commentators note, studies of
corruption should not be limited solely to the payment of bribes.19

18. Joel S. Hellman et al., Beyond the "GrabbingHand" of Government in
Transition:Facing up to "State Capture"by the CorporateSector, TRANSITION:
THE NEWSL. ABOUT REFORMING ECONOMIES (World Bank/William Davidson
Inst./Stockholm Inst. for Transition Economies/Bank of Finland Inst. for
Economies in Transition, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2000, at 8 [hereinafter
Beyond the Grabbing Hand], http'//www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/pdf/

MarApr2000new.pdf. According to the traditional understanding, "behind this
definition of corruption lies an image of a predatory state seen as a large
'grabbing hand,' extorting firms for the benefit of politicians, high officials and
bureaucrats." Id.
19. BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, supra note 16, at 4. Many corruption surveys

are inadequate because they are limited to bribery. Id.
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II. CORRUPTION IN PERSPECTIVE

This section examines various definitions of corruption,
distinguishes between grand and petty corruption, and explains
the different motives behind the two. I also present a few reasons
why anti-corruption efforts need to be directed primarily at
instances of grand corruption. Apart from "defining" corruption, I
also examine the detrimental effects that corruption has on the
economic, political, and legal development of the affected
countries.
A.

Corruptionand How Do You Define the [Not So] Obvious?

Although corruption is a universally recognized phenomenon,
"[t]he challenges facing corruption analysts begin with how to
define it.""0 To some people corruption may seem deceivingly
obvious. As Elliott observes, "[miost people know corruption when
they see it. The problem is that different people see it
differently."" Perceptions of corruption vary depending on factors
such as the industry where it is observed," the governing laws,
and the local culture.'
Experts define corruption differently
depending on the field of their expertise.
Some economists consider corruption to be the "exploitation of
economic rents which arise from the monopoly position of public
officials."24 Other authors note that "[wihenever a public official
has discretionary power over distribution to the private sector of a
benefit or cost, incentives for bribery are created."" Shleifer and
Vishny consider government corruption to be "the sale by
governmental officials of government property for personal gain."26
20. Elliot, supra note 15, at 177.
21. Id.
22. PoliticalEconomy of Corruption, supra note 10, at 31. Corruption may

differ widely within a country, where "some industries, governmental
departments, and lower-level governments are very corrupt while others are
not." Id.
23. See Globalization and Fragmentation,supra note 6, at 258 (comparing
anti-bribery laws from around the world). Relying on the understanding that
"corruption is the misuse of public power for private gain," Susan
Rose-Ackerman correctly points out that in many societies there is no clear
distinction between a person's public and private life. SUSAN ROSEACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
REFORM 91 (1999) [hereinafter CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT]. Additionally
the understanding of what constitutes a bribe and what is considered simply a
gift can vary from country to country. Id.
Often there is no clear line
distinguishing a gift as an altruistic gesture and a bribe aiming to derive an

illegal benefit. Id at 96-104.
24. Shihata, supra note 14, at 453. Shihata also offers the interpretation
that corruption arises in cases where the benefit of acting contrary to the
public good and public expectation out-weighs the costs of doing so. Id.
25. Political Economy of Corruption,supra note 10, at 31.
26. SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 17, at 91.
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Legal experts tend to view corruption as the disregard and
violation of established rules in order to acquire personal gain,
which leads to "arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers and the
illegitimate use of public resources.""
Regardless of the
definitional differences, the predominant view is that corruption
involves a transaction where a governmental official 8 abuses a
position of trust for personal gain and enrichment. 9
Even though every one of the elements in the above
"definition" may present an interpretational challenge, ° I will
focus only on the size of the gain the corrupt official realizes.
Research in this area often addresses corruption without sufficient
distinction among its various forms. In that sense, Mauro writes
that available indicators of corruption are plagued with generality;
"they do not distinguish, for example, between high-level
corruption (such as kickbacks to a defense minister for the
purchase of expensive jetfighter aircraft) and low-level corruption
(such as that of a minor official accepting a bribe to expedite
issuance of a driver's license)."' The following sub-section divides
corruption in two distinct categories, based not only on the size of
the bribe, but also on the motive behind the bribe.
B. Greed, Need, and the Distinction Between Grand and Petty
Corruption'
The most obvious distinction between bribes is their size and
the motives for paying or accepting them. We are all well aware
that bribes may vary enormously in scale. Examples abound. In a
current investigation under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA"), 33 authorities are considering allegations that Exxon
Corporation has engaged in a scheme to pay $78 million to the
highest-ranking official in Kazakhstan, the country's president. 4
Payments of that magnitude are not an exception. The Securities
Exchange Commission recently commenced a civil action against
Montedison for alleged payments to various Italian officials that
amounted to almost $400 million. 5 Grand corruption that involves
bribes in the millions differs substantially from bribery in the form
of gifts, entertainment, or minor "grease payments" in the
27. Shihata, supra note 14, at 455-56.
28. See PoliticalEconomy of Corruption,supra note 10, at 31-33 (noting the
central role of the public official in corrupt practices).
29. Shihata, supra note 14, at 459.
30. See Elliott, supra note 15, at 177.
31. Mauro, supra note 12, at 84.
32. For a more in depth discussion of this distinction, see generally A
Delicate Balance, supra note 7.
33. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (codified as amended in scattered

sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000)).
34. LeVine, supra note 9.
35. A Delicate Balance, supra note 7, at 667.
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amounts of a few hundred dollars. But where does one draw the
line between grand and petty bribery? As Steven Salbu points out,
"[a] bribe valued above $1,000 is relatively large; a bribe valued
below $100 is relatively small [and a] demarcation point in the
buffer zone is rationally impossible to choose, but pragmatically
necessary."36 Salbu decides to use $1,000 as a threshold numberbribes valued in excess of that number can be considered grand
bribery, while bribes valued at $1,000 or less may be defined as
petty bribes.
The FCPA and the more recent Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions8 (the "OECD Convention") unfortunately
do not distinguish between grand and petty bribery, but refer to
bribery in general.39
Grand and petty bribery differ not only in their size, but also
in the resulting level of negative social effects, as well as the
motives behind them.' Compared to grand bribery, petty bribes
are very difficult to qualify as corrupt, a judgment which is often
culture-specific.4" Petty bribery often takes the form of minor
payments, gifts, tips, hospitality, or entertainment, which seem to
many a natural part of doing business.42 Petty corruption is also
often caused by low pay in the public sector and the resulting
poverty of public officials.' Taking petty bribes may be caused by
the lack of basic necessities, which small bureaucrats in poor
states cannot afford." Petty bribery is often the result of need
rather than greed." The reasons for giving or taking a bribe, in
some countries, may seem trivial to a person in a developed
country. For example, petty bribes are often paid to get "a
telephone, a passport or a driver's license, [which] cannot be

36. Id. at 663.
37. Id.

38. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. No. 10543 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
39. Id. at art. 1(3).
40. A Delicate Balance, supranote 7, at 663-66.
41. See CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 23, at 91-110 (noting
that "the distinctions between prices, bribes, gifts, and tips are difficult both to
draw and to evaluate normatively").
42. Id. See also Steven R. Salbu, ExtraterritorialRestriction of Bribery: A
PrematureEvocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223,
234-240 (1999) [hereinafter Global Village] (discussing gift giving).
43. A Delicate Balance, supra note 7, at 669-71. Salbu points out taking

bribes may arise from the lack of basic necessities such as food and shelter.
Id. at 669.
44. Elliot, supra note 15, at 184; A Delicate Balance, supra note 7, at 669-

71.
45. A Delicate Balance, supra note 7, at 669-71.
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obtained expeditiously without a payoff."'
On the other hand, the motives behind engaging in grand
corruption and paying thousands or even millions of dollars are
often to gain a competitive advantage over other market
participants in contract bidding.47 A firm may pay off an official in
order to be included in a list of bidders, to have the bidding
qualifications apply only to it, or even to be selected as the
winning bidder.' Unlike cases of petty bribery, grand bribery is
the hallmark of major multinational corporations dealing at the
highest governmental levels.49
Rose-Ackerman notes that
"[c]orrupt payments to win major contracts and concessions are
generally the preserve of large businesses and high-level
officials.""0 Such incidents of corruption "represent a substantial
expenditure of funds" even for powerful businesses." The nature
of these large payments and the position of their recipients
suggests that the motives for requesting and taking such
significant sums is greed rather than daily need.52
Why is such a distinction important? Legislative efforts and
corporate codes of conduct need to focus primarily on instances of
grand corruption for two primary reasons. First, extraterritorial
prosecution of petty practices such as gift-giving, tipping, and
hospitality is largely ineffective' and runs the risk of cultural
imperialism.' In many cultures such practices are not considered
corrupt, but rather they are means of building lasting business
relationships and establishing mutual trust.M In countries such as
Japan, South Korea, China, and Malaysia, gift-giving is of
significant importance and serves various purposes, including
expressing gratitude and loyalty, expressing understanding, being
a part of a formal etiquette, and being a part of hospitality in
general.' From that perspective, change in attitudes about gift-

46. CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 23, at 15.

47. A Delicate Balance, supra note 7, at 664.
48. Political Economy of Corruption, supra note 10, at 35. Additional
motives may be to avoid qualifying requirements, to get access to needed
credit, or to qualify for certain favorable tariff classification. Id. at 35-36.
49. See generally LeVine, supra note 9.
50. CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 23, at 27.
51. Id.

52. See The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, supra note 11, at 69
(pointing to instances where governmental officials in some African countries
have become much wealthier than the local businesspeople as a result of
taking bribes).
53. See generally Global Village, supra note 42.
54. Id. at 240.
55. Id. at 234-36.
56. Id. at 234-40. The South Korean concept of chonji, for example, is
highly important for establishing relationships with teachers, bankers, or
bureaucrats. Id. at 235. Chonji is often expressed through material gifts for

favorable treatment by the recipient. Id. at 235-36.
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giving or tipping should be left to the local society and
government, rather than being forced from the outside."
Second, instances of grand corruption, although less frequent,
are far more damaging economically and socially.58
Grand
corruption is also universally condemned and therefore much
easier to target.59 Another consideration is that once the efforts
against grand bribery are successful it will be much easier to
address issues of petty bribery.'
Instances of grand corruption are particularly harmful in the
economies of the former communist bloc, where the rule of law is
still developing, public institutions are young and the democratic
process is fragile."1
And although grand corruption usually
appears in its "traditional" form (pay-offs in contract procurement,
for example), researchers have begun to focus on a somewhat
under-researched form of corruption with far-reaching negative
implications, which has been increasingly known under the term
"state capture."
III.

THE EFFECTS OF STATE CAPTURE & CORRUPTION: SLOW

DEVELOPMENT, WEAK STATES AND STRUGGLING DEMOCRACIES

The transition from planned, socialist economy to a free
market economy required the state to release numerous
businesses and institutions from its suffocating grip. After the end
of the Cold War, former communist countries engaged in a painful
process of privatization and deregulation. Naturally, during this
period of transition, researchers focused on the often predatory
role of the state and the state's level of control over private
businesses.62 Attention was on the government because in the

57. Id. at 235.
58. A Delicate Balance, supra note 7, at 665.
59. See Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational
Intrusion, 33 CORNELL IN'L L.J. 627, 629-30 (2000).
60. See Fritz F. Heimann, CombatingInternational Corruption:The Role of
the Business Community, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 147, 154
(Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (noting that currently the main goal should
be "to stop large bribes to politicians and senior officials").
61. BiALOs & HUSIsIAN, supra note 8,at 13. Grand corruption
undoubtedly retards the formation of democratic institutions, economic
development, and the rule of law in many societies. The problem is
perhaps most acute in post-communist societies.
After decades of
communist dictatorship, with law serving as an instrument of, rather
than a check on, arbitrary state power, the rule of law is fragile and
largely undeveloped in these countries.

Id.
62. JOEL S. HELLMAN ET AL., SEIZE THE STATE, SEIZE THE DAY: STATE
CAPTURE, CORRUPTION, AND INFLUENCE IN TRANSITION 1-5 (The World
Bank/European Bank of Reconstruction & Dev., Policy Research Working
Paper
No.
2444,
2000)
[hereinafter
SEIZE
THE
STATE],
http://www.worldbank.orgtwbi/governance/pdf/seize.pdf.
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countries of the former Soviet bloc corruption was often associated
with the "grabbing hand"6 of the state, where bureaucrats (often
former communist apparatchiks) extorted payments from local and
foreign businesses.
This focus, however important, diverted the
experts' attention away from the actions of many foreign and
domestic firms that were gaining strength and influence. After
more than a decade of transition, the fear of the leviathan state6
has been replaced by the fear of powerful oligarchs' who rival in
power the state itself.7 Such oligarchs have the capability to
"manipulate politicians, shape institutions, and control the media
to advance and protect their own empires at the expense of social
interest."
Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann are
63. See generally SULEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 17. Shleifer & Vishny
introduce the "grabbing hand" model of government as an alternative to the
"invisible hand" or the "helping hand" models. Id. at 2-7. The invisible hand
model "is the laissez-faire view of the state" grounded in the belief that
markets work best without any government intervention. Id. at 3. According
to the model, the government's role is limited to the "basic functions needed to
support a market economy, such as the provision of law, order, and national
defense." Id. The authors note that the invisible hand model is not useful for
generating policy advice for its failure to examine the reasons for government
intervention and the role of politics in government regulations. Id. The
helping hand model is mostly a post World War II "cure" to perceived market
failures. "According to this model, unbridled free markets lead to monopoly
pricing, to externalities such as pollution, to unemployment, to defective credit
supply to firms, and to failures of regional development." Id. at 2. What the
model proposes as solutions is "corrective taxes, regulations, and aggregate
demand management to price controls, government ownership, and planning."
Id. The authors note that the helping hand model "has failed as both a
descriptive and a prescriptive model of government." Id. at 3. One of the
major shortcomings of the model, according to the authors, is that it falsely
"presumes that the government will maximize social welfare." Id. The
grabbing hand model shares some basic understandings with both models. Id.
It has a skeptical view of the government, but unlike the invisible hand model
it follows more accurately what governments do. Id. Its similarity with the
helping hand model is that they both share "activist interest in reforming
government" although in very different ways. Id. at 3-4. At the core of the
grabbing hand concept "are models of political behavior that argue that
politicians do not maximize social welfare and instead pursue their own selfish
objectives." Id. at 4.
64. Beyond the GrabbingHand, supra note 18, at 8.
65. This characterization is particularly appropriate for the former
authoritarian governments in Central and Eastern Europe. See SEIZE THE
STATE, supra note 62, at 1.
66. Id. To some observers oligarchs dominate the state to such an extent
that they directly influence a country's most vital functions: "[tihey wrote laws
[and] appointed ministers, often entire cabinets, and made sure that their
interests were served." Beyond the GrabbingHand, supra note 18, at 1.
67. See generally SEIZE THE STATE, supra note 62 (examining in detail the
nature of state capture and the extent to which firms engage in state capture
practices).
68. Id. at 1.
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three researchers who have focused their attention on the problem
of state capture. In a series of papers, these authors analyzed the
results of a Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey ("BEEPS")69 that examines different kinds of corrupt
transactions and the way these transactions affect the
performance of a pool of sampled firms. Hellman, Jones, and
Kaufmann define state capture as "the extent to which firms make
illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials in
order to influence the formation of laws, rules, regulations or
The fundamental difference
decrees by state institutions."70
between state capture and the type of grand corruption already
discussed" is that state capture involves "shap[ing] and affect[ing]
the formation of the basic rules of the game" through control over
the law-making process, rather than over the award of contracts or
The authors distinguish
the implementation of regulations. 2
between state capture on one hand, and administrative
corruption73 and public procurement kickbacks7' on the other. The
analysis of state capture is based on a comprehensive survey
developed jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ("EBRD")." The results of the
survey are based on interviews with owners and firm managers of
twenty-two transition
approximately 3,600 firms across
economies."

69. STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES, supra note 10,

at 3.
70. SEIZE THE STATE, supra note 62, at 5-6.
71. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
72. SEIZE THE STATE, supra note 62, at 3.

73. Id. at 5. This is a more traditional type of corruption, where "firms
make illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials in order
to alter the prescribed implementation of administrative regulations placed by
the state on the firm's activities." Id.
74. This form of corruption is "defined as illicit private payments to public
officials to secure public procurement contracts." STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE
IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES, supra note 10, at 6. Another concept analyzed by
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufman was that of influence. "Influence" is a variation
of state capture in the sense that firms still exert influence over the formation
of laws, rules and regulations, but without making direct payments to
governmental officials. SEIZE THE STATE, supra note 62, at 6.
75. SEIZE THE STATE, supra note 62, at 5.
76. Id.
The survey was conducted through on-site visits and personal
Id.;
interviews with the managers or owners of the sampled firms.
STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES, supra note 10, at 45. Most of the sampled firms were private enterprises, although there was a
representative quota for state-owned firms. Id. The countries included in the
BEEPS survey were Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Id.

1192

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:1181

A. Corruptionand State Capture: Economic Effects
By now most researchers have agreed that corruption in its
various forms is detrimental to sound economic development and
the operation of free and open markets.77 Corruption is harmful
because it "sets prices not through supply and demand, but
through self-serving, inefficient preferences" 78 that act against the
laws of free competition. Corruption results in waste, resource
misallocation,"9 market distortion, lack of foreign investment, and
unfair competition ° because it relies on a decision-making process
that favors a corrupt agent rather than the superior quality of
products and services."
Corruption, in combination with a weak legal system (which
is usually the case), results in lower tax revenues for the state. 2
High levels of corruption tend to drive legitimate businesses
underground, which leads to a situation where "countries with
more corruption have a higher share of unofficial economy."' The
result is a self-perpetuating problem with corruption: when firms
go underground, "tax revenues fall, and the quality of public
administration declines accordingly, further reducing a firm's
incentives to remain 'official.' 84
Similar results emerge from the more narrow study of state
capture. Captor firms purchase laws that give them tax breaks
that deprive the state of revenue. A recent study of a sample of
regional firms in Russia showed "a strong negative statistically
significant association between regional tax revenues and all
capture measures."" The study also found that an "increase in
persistent preferential treatment concentration decreases regional
tax revenues as well as total net tax revenues." 8 State capture
also impedes the growth of small businesses in the short run, 7
although in the long run captor firms are not expected to
outperform non-captor firms.' Because of their relationship with
77. Almond & Syfert, supra note 3, at 434.
78. Id.
79. See The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, supra note 11, at 70-71;
Mauro, supra note 12, at 104 (noting that corruption has an adverse effect on
economic growth through lowering private investment).
80. The Next Frontierof InstitutionalReform, supra note 11, at 70-71.
81. Nichols, supra note 59, at 631.
82. ERIC FRIEDMAN ET AL.,
DETERMINANTS OF UNOFFICIAL

DODGING THE GRABBING HAND: THE
ACTIVITY IN 69 COUNTRIES 2 (1999),

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=194628#PaperDownload.

83. Id. at 20.
84. Id.
85. Irina Slinko et al., State Capture in the Russian Regions 12 (Nov. 14,
2002), http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/zhuravskaya/pub0l.pdf.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 11-13.
88. See generally STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES,

supra note 10.
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captor firms, authorities often create obstacles for the development
of small businesses that are trying to compete with large
incumbents. 9 Such obstacles, on the other hand, often cause small
firms or newcomers to engage in state capture themselves in order
to stay in the market. 9° Thus, state capture becomes a choice
strategy9 ' for newcomer firms entering a market dominated by
powerful incumbents, a vicious cycle that is difficult to interrupt
when entrenched interests are at stake. 2
In addition, state capture also reduces foreign direct
investment ("FDI') inflows and "attracts lower quality investment
in terms of governance standards."93 Interestingly, many FDI
firms in high-capture countries appear to increase the level of
corruption and state capture instead of remedying the problem.94
These findings confirm the concerns of some commentators that
extraterritorial legislation, such as the FCPA, has not resulted in
higher standards of corporate ethics in firms affected by its
provisions, even though the FCPA has been in effect since the
1970s. 95
B. Corruption& State Capture:Effect on Institutionsand
Commitment to Reform
Instances of corruption and state capture have a negative
effect on the public's commitment to economic and democratic
reforms in many transition economies. Perceptions that corrupt
businesses and lawmakers dominate the social landscape has
resulted in disillusionment and has turned people away from
active participation in the democratic process.'
Such
disillusionment and even cynicism can be harmful for the reform
process in these countries. 97 Achievements in anti-corruption
efforts and new government programs against corruption are often
dismissed as empty promises and posturing.9 The danger is that
"'blindness to success' could undermine even successful market
reforms."'
Lack of trust in public institutions and the government is not

89. Slinko, et al., supra note 85, at 16.
90. Beyond the GrabbingHand, supranote 18, at 10.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 10; SEIZE THE STATE, supra note 62, at 16.
93. STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES, supra note 10,
at 21.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See generally KRASTEV, supra note 11.
97. Id.
98. Never Had It So Good, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2003, at 69 (noting that
policies targeted at "predatory elites" in transition economies are hard to
implement because of low levels of public support).
99. Id.
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a problem reserved solely for transition economies. In parts of
Italy, for example, lack of trust in the Italian state have led people
to seek protection by the Mafia. As Rose-Ackerman notes, "[tihe
state failed to provide a reliable method of resolving disputes and
The Mafia arose as
managing private property transfers.
substitute."' 0 Similarly, people in former communist countries
tend to be suspicious of their governments due to long years of
governmental oppression and propaganda. Such societies are
characterized by "[low levels] of respect for the law inherited from
centuries of foreign domination (i.e., Ottoman, Tzarist Russia),
imperial bureaucratic structures (i.e., Austro-Hungarian), and
decades of communism." 1 Considering the rather fragile public
commitment to governmental reform, high levels of state capture
can be extremely damaging. Lack of trust in governments also
exemplifies why corporate codes of conduct and multinational
businesses not associated with the totalitarian past may enjoy
higher credibility in the public arena.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS: THE ROLE OF THE OECD, MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT IN ERADICATING
CORRUPTION

Efforts in eradicating corruption may be successful only if
they become a part of a broad effort that addresses corruption
from all possible sides."2 As Dunfee and Hess comment, what is
needed is a comprehensive, "portfolio approach" in combating
corruption. 3 No single solution exists and "none of the individual
strategies [such as] the FCPA, the OECD convention, NGOs, [and]
corporate principles ... by themselves will be sufficient to
eliminate corruption."" ' An effective anti-corruption portfolio
players,
of corporate
requires the active participation
governmental players, and civil society involvement.0 5
A. The OECD Convention and treatment of foreign subsidiaries
A simple example of governmental involvement is the
implementation of legislation in accordance with international
anti-bribery agreements. In this regard, the role of the OECD
Convention, as a part of a portfolio approach, is of extreme
100. CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 23, at 97.
101. United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in PostCommunist States-Lessons from Practice 7 (Jan. 15, 2002) [hereinafter

UNDP], http://www.transparency.org.ru/CENTER/DOC/book04_eng.pdf.
102. Heimann, supra note 60, at 147.
103. Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the "Tipping
Point": The Role of Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption

Strategies,21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 471, 471-73 (2001).
104. Id. at 472.
105. Id. at 482-83.
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importance. The OECD Convention is probably the most powerful
legislative weapon in combating corruption in international
business transactions, considering its extraterritorial implications
and the large number of country participants.0 Similar to the
FCPA, the OECD Convention criminalizes the bribery of foreign
public officials in international business transactions, specifically
bribery for purposes of obtaining and retaining business.' ° The
prohibitions of the OECD Convention, however, do not reach
bribery of foreign public officials that is carried out by the foreignincorporated
subsidiaries of companies
covered by the
Convention."°8 While it is true that the language of the Convention
allows for some flexibility by requiring that parties take measures
"to establish that complicity in, including incitement, aiding and
abetting, or authorisation [sic] of an act of bribery of a foreign
public official shall be a criminal offense,"" such language still
allows firms to circumvent the Convention and engage in bribery
through their foreign subsidiaries."0 One of the reasons why the
drafters did not extend the Convention's reach to foreign
subsidiaries may have been concern over the intrusiveness of the
extraterritorial application of such laws."'
Despite these concerns, it is important to address foreign
subsidiaries because of their role in corruption and state capture.
The research done by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, although
not dealing specifically with foreign subsidiaries, is of significant
relevance. Hellman and his colleagues suggest that in countries
with significant state capture levels, FDI firms are almost twice as
likely to engage in state capture as their domestic counterparts.'
The FDI firms subject to the study can be divided into two groups:
FDI firms with local headquarters and FDI firms with foreign
headquarters (mostly multinational corporations)."' The data, as
analyzed by the survey, shows that FDI firms with foreign
headquarters engage in state capture to a lesser extent than firms
106. Parties to the convention are the OECD member states, plus five nonmember states: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic.
Keith Loken, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Coverage of Foreign
Subsidiaries,33 GEO. WASH. INTOL L. REv. 325, 325 n.2 (2001).
107. OECD Convention, supra note 38, at art. 1.
108. Loken, supra note 106, at 331-33.
109. OECD Convention, supra note 38, at art. 1(2).
110. Loken, supra note 106, at 333. Loken presents a hypothetical, where a
parent corporation is a national of a party signatory to the Convention, but its
foreign subsidiary is a national of a non-party. Id. In cases where the foreign
subsidiary engages in bribery on the territory of a country not a signatory to
the convention, and the corporate agents are nationals of a non-member state,

the acts of bribery most probably will not be covered by the Convention. Id.
111. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
112. STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES, supra note 10,

at 12.
113. Id. at 15.
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with local headquarters."" One reason is that larger
multinationals have greater resources for training and
implementation of compliance procedures than their smaller
counterparts located in transition countries. 1 ' At the same time,
multinationals often work with local partners through jointventures and local subsidiaries, which are more prone to engage in
state capture.
In this sense, corporate codes of conduct and compliance
programs may be very suitable to address corruption by foreign
subsidiaries, especially since they are not covered by the OECD
Convention. 7 Corporate codes that extend to foreign subsidiaries
and require compliance with the prohibitions of the Convention
could be very effective in curbing corruption. 18 In this way, the
often rigid extraterritorial laws will be supplemented with more
flexible internal corporate regulations.
The need for more flexibility and for coverage of areas that
were left out by the Convention leads us to the second important
element of an anti-bribery "portfolio approach," the role of
corporate action.
B. CorporateAction: Codes of Conduct, Guidelines and Principles
Many commentators favor corporate action over governmental
involvement through legislation, which in essence is inherently
coercive. 19 In comparison to governments, corporations are less
likely to be charged with moral imperialism, ° as they are less
coercive and more flexible in the application of their guidelines
and codes of conduct."1 Corporations are limited to less compelling
sanctions-an employee can be demoted, suspended or dismissed
for violating a corporate policy, but will not be incarcerated for an
offence against the corporate guidelines."' This softer approach
may be preferable in the international field, because of its less
intrusive nature and greater flexibility.

114. Id. at 15-17.
115. Id. at 15-16.
116. See id. (noting that multinationals rely on local businesspeople who
know "how to get things done" in their country).
117. Loken, supra note 106, at 336.
118. See generally Loken, supra note 106.
119. Steven R. Salbu, TransnationalBribery: The Big Questions, 21 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 435, 454 (2001) [hereinafter The Big Questions].
120. Id. Not according to all. Some U.S. corporations have been targeted for
bringing in "western" or "American" cultural domination. See Elaine Sciolino,
Prison Looms for French Farmer,An Anti-Globalization Gadfly, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2002, at A9 (noting that Jose Bove, the French farmer who became
known for his attacks on McDonald's restaurants in France, has been
sentenced to serve fourteen months in prison).
121. The Big Questions, supra note 119, at 454.
122. Id.
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The OECD Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprises23

The OECD has not limited its anti-corruption activities to the
requirements of the Convention, but has rather promoted a
broader set of instruments for combating corruption. 2 4
One
particularly important instrument is the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises ("Guidelines")."'
Although the
Guidelines do not focus exclusively on combating corruption,
chapters II, III, and VI address bribery and practices of corporate
disclosure. 126 The scope of the Guidelines in addressing corruption
is substantially broader than the scope of the OECD Convention.
While the OECD Convention deals exclusively with the bribery of
foreign public officials, the Guidelines reach public and private
parties serving as active or passive participants in corrupt
practices.127 Chapter VI of the Guidelines specifically states that
"[e]nterprises should not, directly or indirectly, offer, promise, give
or demand a bribe or other undue advantage to obtain or retain
business or other improper advantage."" Furthermore, chapter
VI refers to private actors in corrupt practices by naming
"employees of business partners" as possible recipients or sources
of bribes."9 The language in chapter VI allows for a much broader
treatment of corruption. Since the identity of the other party in
the transaction is not restricted, the other party may be a
government official, a private business person, or a political
figure."'
Addressing bribery of public officials, as well as of
political figures, is of extreme importance in reducing instances of
state capture, which have political implications since captor firms
seek to purchase laws that will favor them over other market

participants.12
123.

ORG.

FOR ECON.

MULTINATIONAL

CO-OPERATION

ENTERPRISES

(2000)

&

DEV.,

OECD

[hereinafter

GUIDELINES

OECD

FOR

GUIDELINES],

availableat httpJ/www.oecd.orgdataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
124. See OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN., FISCAL & ENTER. AFFAIRS, ANTI-

OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 4 (2003) [hereinafter ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTRUMENTS],
available at httpJ/www.oecd.org/dataoecd0/33/2638728.pdf.
Other broad
anti-bribery instruments include The Recommendations of the Council on
Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service Including Principles for
Managing Ethics in the Public Service; The OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance; and The Draft Guidelines for Managing Conflicts of Interest in
the Public Service.
125. For a comparison between the Guidelines and other multilateral antibribery instruments (including the above mentioned OECD instruments) see
id. at 14-16.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id. at 11-12.
128. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 123, at 24.
129. Id.
CORRUPTION INSTRUMENTS AND THE

130. ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTRUMENTS, supra note 124, at 11.
131. See generally SEIZE THE STATE, supra note 62.
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The Guidelines also address the treatment of foreign
subsidiaries, which was left open by the OECD Convention and, as
already discussed, allows a possible escape route for corporations
that are willing to go around the OECD Convention's prohibitions.
The question of subsidiaries is generally addressed in chapter II,
where the drafters state that corporations need to "[e]ncourage,
where practicable, business partners, including suppliers and
subcontractors to apply principles of corporate conduct compatible
32
with the Guidelines."'
Although the Guidelines are only in the
form of recommendations and do not legally bind business
entities,133 such references to corporations and their business
partners are an important first step toward establishing a broad
standard covering foreign subsidiaries.
Although chapter III of the Guidelines does not specifically
deal with corruption, its focus on corporate transparency is
extremely important in combating bribery and state capture.
Chapter III, entitled "Disclosure," encourages the adoption of
practices that promote transparency" in corporate policies,
auditing, and accounting practices.13' Chapter III focuses on
disclosure of "timely, regular, reliable and relevant information
[regarding corporate] activities, structure, financial situation and
performance." 6 Further, the Guidelines promote the application
of "high quality standards for disclosure, accounting, and audit."'37
Making transactions transparent is essential for reducing the
instances of bribery, since many commentators agree that secrecy
is a necessary element in transactions involving bribery.'
In that sense, corporations should be encouraged to adopt the
recommendations promoted in the Guidelines. Chapters III and

132. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 123, at 19; ANTI-CORRUPTION
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 124, at 14.
133. See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 123, at 15 (stating that the
Guidelines provide "voluntary principles and standards for responsible
business conduct consistent with applicable laws").
134. Id. at 20. See also William B.T. Mock, Corporate Transparency and
Human Rights, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 15, 17 (2000) (defining
transparency as a "measure of the degree to which information about
significant procedures, plans, and actions is made available to interested

parties").
135. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 123, at 20; Anti-CorruptionInstruments,
supra note 124, at 13.
136. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 123, at 20.
137. Id. The Guidelines also encourage corporate transparency with regard

to corporate affiliates, as well as to material information "on: a) The financial
and operating results of the company. b) Company objectives. c) Major share
ownership and voting right. d) Members of the board and key executives, and
their remuneration. e) Material foreseeable risk factors. ) Material issues
regarding employees and other stakeholders. g) Governance structures and

policies." Id.
138. Eliott, supra note 15, at 187; Heimann, supra note 60, at 152-59.
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VI both set up a solid foundation for a corporate code of conduct
that can be modeled according to the business culture of the
specific country where the business is located.
The
recommendations do not specify dollar amounts or specific acts
that constitute "corruption" across the board, rather they leave a
wide margin for the corporation to create a code according to its
own business and national standards. Other commentators have
presented similar understandings of corporate needs.
2. Dunfee & Hess and the "C2 Principles"
One corporate code approach recommended by Dunfee and
Hess is the Combating Corruption Principles ("C2 Principles"),
which focuses on disclosure and transparent practices in corporate
action without trying to "define" the different types of corrupt
behavior."s9 According to the C2 Principles, a corporation must
pledge to observe the following requirements:
1. To disclose publicly and make widely known its endorsement of
the C2 Principles.
2 To establish a clearly articulated written policy against the
payment of bribes and "kickbacks" by the firm's employees.
3. To implement the policy with due care and take appropriate
disciplinary action against any employee discovered to have made
payments in violation of the policy.
4. To provide training for employees to carry out the policy [and] to
assist employees to act in compliance with the firm's policy.
5. To record all transactions fully and fairly, in accordance with
clearly stated record keeping procedures and accounting controls,
and conduct internal audits to assure no improper payments are
made.
6. To report annually on the firm's bribery and corruption policy
along with a description of the firm's experience in implementing
and enforcing the policy.
7. To have the annual report in principle audited either by an
independent financial auditor or by an independent social auditor,
or both.
8. To require all agents of the firm to affirm that they have neither
made nor will make any improper payments in any business
venture or contract to which the firm is a party.
9. To require all suppliers of the firm to affirm that they have
neither made nor will make any improper payments in any business
139. Dunfee & Hess, supra note 103, at 482.
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venture or contract to which the firm is a party.
10. To establish a monitoring and auditing system to detect any
improper payments made by the firm's employees and agents.
11. To report publicly any solicitations for payments (or report
privately to a monitoring organization or a social auditor).
12. To establish a system to allow any employee or agent of the firm
to report any40 improper payment without fear of retribution for their
disclosures.1
Similar to the OECD Guidelines, the C2 Principles "[b]y
virtue of their lack of specificity.., leave breathing room for
decision-makers to exercise responsible ethical judgment."41 The
common denominator supporting the Guidelines and the C2
Principles is their emphasis on disclosure and transparency. Both
are based on the understanding that corruption exists in secret
and opaque transactions and that public exposure of these
transactions will act as a strong deterrent. Both approaches also
recognize that simply creating a detailed list of "corrupt" practices
will be futile.
C. The Importance of Social [Relaction and Public Awareness
The third essential element of a "portfolio approach" against
corruption and international bribery is the active awareness and
participation of the public. A public stance against corruption can
have a serious impact on corporations just as the public stance on
issues such as the environment and labor conditions has led to
results.'
The importance of public awareness has been
emphasized by international organizations on various occasions.
In a recent report on the application of the OECD Convention, the
OECD expert group noted that "the area of awareness raising [sic]
is one in which NGOs and civil society generally can make an
important contribution."" Public awareness and participation is
particularly important in the economies in transition where anticorruption laws may be formally enacted, but the enforcement of
140. The Big Questions, supra note 118, at 458-59.
141. Id. at 460.
142. See generally UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.,
DISCLOSURE OF THE IMPACT OF CORPORATIONS ON SOCIETY: CURRENT TRENDS

AND ISSUES
(2003),
available at http://rO.unctad.org/isar/Reports/
20thsession/ISAR20/isar20english.pdf. See also Mock, supra note 134.
143. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN., FISCAL & ENTER. AFFAIRS, BULGARIA:
PHASE 2, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION
ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2003),

available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/19/2790505.pdf.
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the laws or even knowledge that such laws exist may still be
lagging behind.
A case in point is Bulgaria, which ratified the OECD
Convention and subsequently amended its criminal code in order
to comply with the Convention's requirements."
Bulgaria also
ratified the Council of Europe's Civil Law and Criminal
Conventions on Corruption and introduced the Law on Access to
Public Information.'
A recent OECD report on Bulgaria's
progress noted, however, that there is more to be done in the area
of public and government awareness."'
One of the
recommendations was that there should be additional efforts to
raise the level of awareness among ordinary citizens and
governmental agencies that bribing a foreign public official is a
crime."7
The situation in Bulgaria is common for many of the
transition economies in the former communist bloc.
However,
despite the need for higher awareness, there have been success
stories where "[m]ajor think tanks, academics, [and] media ... are
increasingly forming coalitions to pursue or support anticorruption initiatives [that] advocate and lobby for structured and
at times institutionalized strategies to combat corruption." 141 Such
coalitions "undertake educational activities, assist in assessment
and drafting of legislation, and participate in the monitoring of
privatization and procurement procedures. Prominent examples of
such coalitions (i.e., SPAI, CoE), are found in Albania (hundreds of
NGOs formed the Albanian Coalition against Corruption),
Bulgaria (Coalition 2000), [and] Poland ("Against Corruption"
Programme)."5 ' Public coalitions and NGOs can monitor both the
government and the corporate actors in their dealings and
pressure them for change and higher levels of transparency. Some
authors even suggest that NGOs may not only supplement, but
outright supplant governmental action in the fight against
corruption. 5 '
International organizations have also been increasingly active
in promoting anti-corruption initiatives. The important role of the
OECD was already sufficiently addressed. Other international
144. Id. at 7.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 10.
147. Id. at 10-11. Some of the recommendations included introduction of
codes of conduct and compliance in the business community, as well as
"practical training ... for those actively involved in enforcement, including the
development

of guidelines and typologies,"

as

international economic crime." Id. at 11.
148. See generally UNDP, supra note 101.
149. Id. at 8-9.
150. Id. at 9.
151. The Big Questions, supra note 119, at 461-68.

part of a

"training in
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organizations that have become leaders in the anti-corruption
movement are the World Bank, the IMF, and Transparency
International. 5 2 Both the World Bank and the IMF underwent a
long evolution in their underlying economic policy before they were
Transparency
able to address corruption with full force.15
International has been most active in its anti-corruption efforts
and has been publishing a number of corruption indexes that are
increasingly important for the business world and the anticorruption community. 54

V. CONCLUSION
The rise of corruption awareness is already an undisputed
fact. Higher awareness has led to increasing inquiries into various
anti-corruption strategies as well as to identifying lesser known,
yet still very disruptive, forms of corruption such as state capture.
Current experience and commentary seems to suggest that
extraterritorial legislation in the fight against corruption is often
ineffective.'
Relying solely on legislation may be particularly
ineffective in the fight against state capture, as state capture
represents the distorted relationship between entrenched power
groups and the lawmaking process of a country. 5 6 Commentators
have pointed out that a more comprehensive approach that
involves governments, businesses, NGOs, and public coalitions
will be much more successful in the fight against corruption and
state capture. Among these, of specific importance are corporate
codes of conduct, which do not only discourage bribery, but also
promote transparent corporate policies in operations and auditing.
Of similar importance are NGOs and public coalitions comprised of
citizens from all ranks of society that monitor procurement
contracts, privatization deals, and lawmaking.'57

152. For a detailed discussion of the World Bank's anti-corruption efforts see
Shihata, supra note 14, at 474-83.
153. Id. See also Jonathan Finer, World Bank Focused on Fighting
Corruption; Graft and Bribery, Once Tolerated, Punished by Blacklisting,
WASH. POST, July 4, 2003, at El.

154. Id.
155. Foreign Investors & Corrupt Practices,supra note 12, at 6. The authors

point out that FDI originating in the United States (which has been governed
by the FCPA since the 1970s) "does not appear to be characterized by higher
standards of corporate [governance]." Id.

156. Beyond the GrabbingHand, supra note 18, at 11.
157. Foreign Investment and CorruptPractices,supra note 12, at 7.
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The underlying policy behind these efforts is the need for
greater transparency and increased competition, which will expose
instances of corruption and discourage further corrupt practices.
Such a comprehensive, "portfolio" approach will strike the proper
balance between the need for decisive anti-corruption actions on
one hand, and the need to recognize the complexities of corruption
in a pluralistic business community on the other.

